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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH A. CHAVEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 940404-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Joseph A. Chavez appeals the trial court's 
denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1990) and the trial court's revocation of his probation pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1994). This Court 
has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1994). 
Defendant originally filed two separate appellate 
briefs in this matter (Nos. 940404-CA and 940405-CA). However, 
on the State's motion, this Court, by Order dated 06 December 
1994, consolidated the appeals under Case No. 940404-CA. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly found no good 
cause for defendant to withdraw his guilty plea to the offense of 
burglary. 
"We review the trial court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard. 
The trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with its 
decision will not be set aside unless they are clearly 
erroneous.11 State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993) 
2. Whether the trial court correctly revoked 
defendant's probation, based on his guilty plea to burglary, 
prior to a decision on appeal from the denial of defendant's 
motion to withdraw that guilty plea. 
"Defendant must show that the evidence of a probation 
violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its 
discretion in revoking defendant's probation." State v. Jameson, 
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (Supp. 1994), which 
governs offense level reductions, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) 
(1990) , governing plea withdrawal motions, and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(12) (Supp. 1994), governing probation revocation, are 
copied in appendix A of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), and 
giving false information to a police officer, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1990) (R. 
1, 2). Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to the 
2 
burglary; the misdemeanor charge was dismissed (R. 32) . For the 
burglary, defendant was sentenced to a prison term of one to 
fifteen years (R. 56). Subsequently, defendant moved to withdraw 
his guilty plea (R. 36). The court denied the motion (R. 51). 
At the time he pled guilty to the burglary, defendant 
was on probation imposed upon a prior conviction for retail 
theft, a third degree felony (R. 41). Upon learning of the 
burglary plea, defendant's probation officer moved for an order 
to show cause why defendant's probation should not be revoked (R. 
41, 42). A hearing was held, and the trial court revoked 
defendant's probation.1 Defendant appeals both the denial of 
his plea withdrawal motion and the revocation of his probation. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
As part of defendant's plea bargain on the second-
degree felony burglary charge, the State agreed to "take no 
position at sentencing" (R. 29). At sentencing on 08 April 1994, 
defendant asked the court to enter the conviction as a third-
degree felony, under the level-reduction allowance of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (Supp. 1994), to reduce his possible sentence 
from one-to-fifteen years to zero-to-five years (R. 52). The 
State objected (R. 52). The sentencing court assumed that the 
State opposed the offense level reduction because it was not part 
Although defendant's probation agreement is not contained in 
the record on appeal, the probation officer's affidavit recites 
that defendant violated the customary agreement to obey the law 
while on probation (R. 41). 
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of the plea agreement (R. 53). Upon consultation with defendant, 
defense counsel made the following statement: 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, for the record, I have 
discussed with Mr. Chavez my opinion if the State 
took this position that it would be a violation of 
the plea negotiation and allow him to withdraw his 
guilty plea, or to ask this matter be assigned to 
a different judge for sentencing. I have 
discussed it with him. He does not want to do 
either. He wants to get sentenced. 
(R. 54). Upon review of defendant's criminal record, the trial 
court sentenced him to a prison term of one to fifteen years (R. 
56). Three days later, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea (R. 36). The court denied defendant's motion (R. 51). 
The probation revocation hearing was subsequently held 
before a different district court judge. Defendant explained to 
the court that he was appealing the denial of his motion to 
withdraw the burglary plea and stated that he was prepared to be 
sentenced at that time (T. 7/5/94 at 7). Finding that defendant 
had violated the terms of his probation agreement, the judge 
revoked defendant's probation. He sentenced defendant to the 
original term of zero-to-five years, to run concurrently with the 
burglary sentence of one-to-fifteen years.2 
2The transcript of the 05 July 1994 probation revocation 
hearing, partially copied in the addendum to defendant's brief (No. 
940404-CA) , was not included in the record on appeal. A full copy 
of the transcript, obtained by the Utah Attorney General, is in 
appendix B of this brief. The judgment revoking defendant's 
probation, also dated 05 July 1994, is styled as a commitment to 
the Utah State Prison, and also was not included in the record on 
appeal. It was, however, appended to defendant's notice of appeal, 
and is copied in appendix C of this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea because there was no good cause shown. 
First, defendant abandoned his claim of a breached plea agreement 
when he agreed to be sentenced following the prosecutor's 
objection to his motion to reduce the offense level on the 
burglary. Further, defendant proffered no showing, as required 
by the level-reduction statute, that it would be unduly harsh to 
sentence him at the level to which he pled guilty. Finally, the 
State's objection to the level reduction was proper, because such 
reduction was not contemplated within the plea bargain. 
The trial court properly revoked defendant's probation 
because he committed the pled-to burglary in violation of his 
probation agreement. Defendant provides no authority or analysis 
to support his proposition that the trial court should wait for a 
decision on appeal from the motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
before revoking his probation. Because a criminal conviction is 
valid until overturned on appeal, it is proper to revoke 
probation for another offense, based upon such conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6 (2) (a) (1990). For three reasons, the trial court 
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in this case properly found no good cause for defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
A. BY AGREEING TO BE SENTENCED FOLLOWING 
DISCUSSION OF THE PROSECUTOR'S OBJECTION, 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE STATE 
BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
First, defendant waived his claim that the State, by 
objecting to an offense level reduction, breached the plea 
agreement to "take no position" at sentencing. The trial court 
found that fl[t]he whole issue was discussed on the record, and 
the defendant agreed to go forward with sentencing and not have 
his plea withdrawn at that time" (R. 68). "[W]hen a trial judge 
makes findings of fact in conjunction with its decision [to deny 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea], those findings will not be 
set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Gardner, 
844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). Defendant offers no proof that 
the trial court clearly erred in finding that he agreed to let 
the plea stand despite the State's alleged breach. 
That finding is amply supported by the record. Defense 
counsel's statement to the trial court, following the State's 
objection to defendant's level-reduction motion, clearly reflects 
that defendant knew of his option to move to withdraw his plea, 
based upon the State's alleged breach of the plea bargain.3 
3This occurred during the 08 April 1994 sentencing hearing. 
Defendant had earlier moved for an offense level reduction when he 
pled guilty on 16 March 1994, eliciting an objection from the State 
(R. 54) . Thus defendant twice declined an option to claim that the 
State's objection justified withdrawal of his plea. 
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Defendant did not so move. Rather, upon consultation with 
counsel, he decided to be sentenced forthwith (R. 54). 
The legal consequence of defendant's decision is plain. 
Defendant affirmatively waived his challenge to the State's 
objection as a violation of the plea bargain. He cannot 
resurrect that challenge on appeal. See State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 
1097, 1099 (Utah 1991). 
B. THE STATE FULFILLED ITS PLEA AGREEMENT WITH 
DEFENDANT 
Next, the State's objection to defendant's level 
reduction motion did not breach the plea bargain. The State 
agreed to "take no position" at sentencing, but did not agree to 
"take no position" as to the offense level (R. 52). The plea 
agreement was based on defendant pleading to a second-degree 
felony (R. 27). 
The State objected to the offense level reduction 
because it was outside the plea agreement (R. 52). The 
prosecutor stated that "according to the plea bargain that we 
have, that was not part of [it to] sit on the hands for [section 
76-3-] 402" (R. 52). Defense counsel himself conceded that 
"[n]othing was said" in the plea bargain about a level reduction 
(R. 53). The trial court observed that if the State had intended 
the defendant to be sentenced to a lower-level crime, that would 
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have been part of the plea agreement (R. 53, 70). The court 
properly refused to insert a new term into the agreement.4 
Defendant mis-relies on Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S. 257 (1971), to support his claim that he should be allowed 
to withdraw his guilty plea because the State objected to the 
offense level reduction. In Santobello, the prosecutor agreed to 
make no sentence recommendation; at sentencing, a new prosecutor 
urged the maximum sentence. Id. at 258, 259. The United States 
Supreme Court held that "when a plea rests in any significant 
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it 
can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such 
promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262. 
This case differs from Santobello because the State did 
not make a recommendation as to sentencing. The State merely 
objected to a reduction of the offense level, arguing that the 
level stated in the plea agreement should stand (R. 52). Indeed, 
the plea agreement includes defendant's acknowledgment that he 
could receive a one-to-fifteen year sentence for the second-
degree burglary (R. 27, 29). Within that range, the State made 
no recommendation about the sentence to be imposed, honoring its 
"take no position" promise. 
Defendant's reliance upon State v. Bennett, 657 P.2d 
1353 (Utah 1983), is also misplaced. Bennett involved a trial 
4Under contract law, ambiguities in a written instrument are 
construed against the drafter. Wilburn v. Interstate Elec, 748 
P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1988), cert, dismissed, 774 P.2d 1149 
(Utah 1989) . The plea agreement, at best ambiguous on the level 
reduction question, was drafted by defense counsel. 
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court's rejection of the State's sentencing recommendation. On 
appeal from the sentence, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the 
court was under no obligation to accept the prosecution's 
recommendation." Id. at 1354. Bennett has no relevance to this 
case because there was no recommendation by the prosecutor. 
While no case law appears to be squarely on point, a 
Colorado case supports the view that agreeing to "take no 
position" at sentencing does not include taking no position on 
the offense level. In People v. Standish, 701 P.2d 633, 633 
(Colo. App. 1985), the defendant pled guilty to second degree 
murder; the prosecutor agreed to take no position at sentencing. 
But at sentencing, the prosecutor commented that the facts would 
support a first degree murder conviction. Id. at 634. The 
Colorado court held that the prosecutor's comment did not violate 
the plea agreement because it included no recommendation on how 
to sentence the defendant within the range prescribed for the 
offense level defendant pled guilty to. Id. at 634. 
The prosecutor comment in Standish was more problematic 
than the objection to level reduction in this case, because it 
suggested that the court should sentence defendant to the higher 
end of the range prescribed for the pled-to offense. In this 
case, the prosecutor's objection made no suggestion as to what 
sentence defendant should receive within the range prescribed for 
the second-degree felony defendant pled guilty to. There being 
no reversible error in the more problematic Standish comment, 
there should be none in the prosecutor's objection in this case. 
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C. IT WAS NOT UNDULY HARSH TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT 
FOR A SECOND DEGREE FELONY 
Finally, defendant's level reduction motion was not 
properly supported. He proffered no showing that it would be 
"unduly harsh" to enter his burglary conviction at the second 
degree felony level to which he pleaded guilty (see R. 52). That 
omission effectively divested the trial court of any discretion 
to reduce the burglary conviction to the third degree felony 
level under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (Supp. 1994). The trial 
court tacitly recognized as much, commenting that it would not 
have granted a level reduction even if the State had not objected 
to defendant's motion (R. 70). 
Further, defendant does not contest the trial court's 
finding that, based upon his past criminal record and as 
recommended by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, a 
one-to-fifteen year sentence was appropriate (R. 54-55) . 
Therefore, because there was no legal justification to enter his 
burglary conviction at a lower level, defendant cannot complain 
that the trial court's refusal to do so forms good cause to allow 
him to withdraw his guilty plea. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVOKED DEPENDANT'S 
PROBATION FOR VIOLATION OP HIS PROBATION 
AGREEMENT 
Defendant next asks this Court to hold that his 
probation cannot be revoked until his appeal on the plea 
withdrawal question is decided. For the following three reasons, 
that request should also be rejected. 
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A. THE ISSUE WAS WAIVED BY FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE 
REVOCATION PROCEEDING 
First, and most fundamentally, this point was waived. 
At the probation revocation hearing, defendant informed the judge 
that he was appealing the denial of his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea to the burglary (T. 7/5/94 at 6). However, he never 
argued that the trial court lacked authority to revoke his 
probation; nor did he request a continuance of the probation 
revocation proceedings pending appeal of the plea withdrawal 
question (T. 7/5/94). Utah's probation revocation statute 
expressly provides that "[t]he defendant shall show good cause 
for a continuance" of revocation proceedings. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(12) (c) (ii) (Supp. 1994). 
In fact, rather than request a continuance, defendant 
again stated that he was prepared to be "sentenced" on the 
probation matter (T. 7/5/94 at 7). Thus the question whether the 
court could properly act upon that matter, never presented to the 
trial court, is not open to appellate review. 
B. DEFENDANT PROVIDES NEITHER AUTHORITY NOR 
ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN REVOKING HIS PROBATION 
Next, defendant fails to cite supporting authority or 
provide legal analysis for his claim that the trial court erred 
in revoking his probation prior to a decision on appeal from the 
plea withdrawal matter. Under Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, this Court should decline to review 
defendant's unanalyzed claim. See, e.g., State v. Wareham, 772 
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (refusing to address appellant's claim 
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in the absence of legal analysis and supporting authority); State 
v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (this Court has 
"routinely declined to consider arguments which are not 
adequately briefed on appeal"). Instead, this Court should 
assume the correctness of the trial court judgment. Christensen 
v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah App. 1991). 
Defendant cites cases for the propositions that 
probation revocation must be based on "[w]illful violation of a 
condition of probation," State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah 
App. 1990) , and that the "court may not ignore fundamental 
precepts of fairness," State v. Cowdwell, 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 
1981). Those cases do not bear on the question defendant 
presents--whether the trial court was required to stay the 
probation revocation pending appeal on the plea withdrawal 
question. For failure to provide authority or analysis on this 
question, defendant's argument should be rejected. 
C. NO RULE COMMANDS THAT PROBATION REVOCATION 
SHOULD BE STAYED PENDING APPEAL OF A 
CONVICTION FOR A NEW OFFENSE THAT IS GROUND 
FOR REVOCATION 
Finally, on the merits, probation revocation is not 
conditioned upon the decision of an appeal from conviction for a 
new offense in violation of probation. Such procedure would be 
contrary to the basis for probation and the procedure for 
revocation. 
"On a plea of guilty . . . or conviction of any crime 
or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of 
sentence and place the defendant on probation." Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 77-18-1 (2) (a) (Supp. 1994). Defendant must agree to the 
conditions of the probation and sign the probation agreement. If 
defendant violates any of the terms of the probation agreement, 
the court may revoke the probation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(12) (e) (ii) (Supp. 1994) . 
As a condition of his probation agreement, defendant 
agreed to obey all state and federal laws (R. 41). Defendant 
admitted that he violated a state law by pleading guilty to 
burglary, supporting his final conviction for that offense. See 
State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 207, 171 P.2d 383 (Utah 1946) ("A 
plea of guilty is a confession of the correctness of the 
accusation"). The trial court found that the burglary conviction 
was a violation of defendant's probation agreement and revoked 
probation (T. 7/5/94 at 8) . 
This Court held in State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 591 
(Utah App. 1993) that "a conviction is a conviction regardless of 
whether it is pending on appeal." In Gallegos, the defendant 
argued that the court could not use prior convictions to enhance 
his sentence because he was appealing those convictions. Id. 
This Court rejected that argument because the sentence 
enhancement statute only requires a prior conviction; it does not 
require that the prior conviction be affirmed on appeal. Id. 
Similarly, in this case, the probation revocation 
statute only requires the trial court to find a probation 
violation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12) (e) (ii) (Supp. 1994). It 
does not require that any new crime forming the violation has 
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been affirmed on appeal. The trial court correctly found that 
defendant violated his probation by being convicted of a felony, 
regardless of whether he was appealing the conviction. 
Therefore, the court properly revoked defendant's probation. 
CONCLUSION 
As explained in Point One of this brief, the trial 
court properly denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea to second degree burglary. As set forth in Point Two, the 
court also properly revoked defendant's probation for his prior 
offense, based upon the burglary conviction. Therefore, the 
trial court's judgments should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this QG day of January, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
MARTIN V. GRAVIS, attorney for appellant, 2568 Washington 
Boulevard, Suite 202, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 0 <> day of 
January, 1995. 
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ADDENDA 
APPENDIX A 
(Supp. 1994) 
76-3-402, Conviction of lower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense 
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being 
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant 
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the 
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to 
be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor 
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class 
A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is 
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of 
probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his 
probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, 
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the 
interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the 
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense 
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining 
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
(1990) 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good 
cause shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion, and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Supp. 1994) 
77-18-1- Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
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THE COURT: Are you prepared, Mr. 
Gravis, on Chavez? 
MR. DA1NES: Your Honor, we have a 
stipulation in this case, a commitment to the state 
prison and a Utah Department of Corrections face 
sheet, both of which are state records kept in the 
usual course of business for the state; however, 
neither one is certified. They will stipulate for 
the purpose of this hearing that these are, in fact, 
accurate records and proceedings. 
MR, GRAVIS: That's correct, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: very well. 
MR. DAINES: We would call Mr. Ray 
Salaz to the stand* 
RAYMOND J. SALAZ, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DAINES: 
Q. State your name and occupation, please. 
A. Raymond J. Salaz- I work for the Department of 
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole. 
Q* Mr. Salaz, calling your attention to the 
gentleman seated here at counsel table in the blue 
Laurie Shingle, R.P.R. 
(801) 399-8510 
1 
2 
3 
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shirt, do you know him? 
A
* 
Q* 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, I do. 
What is his name? 
Joseph A* Chavez. 
How do you know him? 
He was placed on probation initially with the --
through the Second District Court 
supervising officer* 
Q
* 
Do you — did you bring with 
Probation Agreement? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I have. 
, and I've 
you today 
Is the Probation Agreement kept in the 
customary course of the business 
Corrections department — I mean, 
or 
A. 
Q-
A. 
Q
* 
A. 
Q. 
whatever they call themselves? 
Field Operations. 
In other words, AP&P? 
AP&P, yes. 
Okay. And did you bring that 
Yes, I have. 
Do you — having worked with 
recognize his signature? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I do. 
Do you have in your file a si 
Agreement? 
* been his 
his J 
usual and 
of the Department of 
Field Op 
with you 
Mr. Chave2 
Division 
today? 
:, do you 
gned Probation 
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1J A* Yes, I have. 
2 Q* Signed by Hr. Chavez? 
3 j A* Yes, I have* 
4 Q. is there a provision in that agreement signed by 
5 him that makes it a violation of his probation to 
6 commit a crime? 
7 A* Yes, there is. 
8 Q. What paragraph is that? 
9 A* That's condition number 5. 
10 Q. Please read that* 
11 A. "I shall1' — 
12 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, we'll 
13 stipulate that paragraph 5 contains a not to commit 
14 any other crime provision* 
15 THE COURT: All right. 
16 Q- (By Mr. Daines) Have you further brought with 
17 you today a form — I don't see a number on this 
18 form. 
19 } A. It's just -- we label it a face sheet, a 
20 I department face sheet for intake purposes. 
21 Q* And is this — and that's intake into the state 
22 prison; is that correct? 
23 A. Actually it's an intake sheet that we use as a 
24 j form to -- identifying characteristics of the case, 
25 of the person, the individual, that we use and keep 
Laurie Shingle, R.P.R. 
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1 as a record in our files* 
2 Q. Did you, also, bring with you a commitment to the 
3 state prison? 
4 K. Yes, I did. 
5 Q* Now, this -- that commitment shows the commitment 
6 is for Burglaryr a second Degree Felony; is that 
7 correct? 
8 A* Yes, that/s correct* 
9 Q. You have caused to be filed a probation — an 
10 Affidavit of Probation Violation alleging Burglary, a 
11 Second Degree Felony, as the undergirding charge in 
12 the probation violation; is that correct? 
13 A. That's correct. 
14 Q* And that is the Affidavit that is before the 
15 court for hearing today? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 Q. The commitment to the state prison that I'm going 
18 to show you here, to which the defense has 
19 stipulated, is this the same Burglary, a Second 
20 Degree Felony — 
21 A. Yes, it is. 
22 Q* — as you've alleged in your affidavit? 
23 A- Yes, it is. 
24 MR. DAINES: I have nothing further. 
25 MR- GRAVIS: No questions, Your 
Laurie Shingle, R.P.R. 
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Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down* 
MR. DAINES: Your Honorf we would — 
if I may approach the bench* 
THE COURT: Yes, you may* 
MR* DAINES: This is a non-certified 
copy that's been stipulated to. I don't think you 
need the face sheet • That shows a commitment — a 
conviction and commitment for Burglary, a Second 
Degree Felony -
THE COURT: okay. 
MR. DAINES; And based on that, we 
would rest* 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gravis? 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, for the 
record, Mr. Chavez has — did enter a plea of guilty 
to the Second Degree Burglary before Judge Glasmann. 
We filed a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea. It was 
heard, I believe, two weeks ago — three weeks ago. 
The decision came down two weeks ago on the 13th of 
June* It was denied* We have since filed an appeal 
on the denial of the Motion to Withdraw a Guilty 
Plea* This hearing was put on today simply to 
preserve this issue for appeal on this matter, Your 
Honor/ fully understanding that the evidence would be 
Laurie Shingle, R*P.R. 
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1 before the Court of the conviction. 
2 MR. DAINES: Your Honor night 
3 remember this case. It was a case where the original 
4 Affidavit alleged "convicted of the offense of 
5 Burglary", and at that time they objected — the 
6 defense — to that, because of the fact that they had 
7 filed the motion to withdraw the plea and that was 
8 pending at that time, a hearing before a district 
9 judge. 
10 We were actually going to put on the offense 
11 of burglary, but since that time, apparently the 
12 district court has denied the motion to withdraw the 
13 I plea* And so we would submit that the conviction is 
14 an assumption that he committed it. 
15 THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I think you 
16 have preserved the issue from the standpoint of the 
17 record• 
18 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, we're 
19 prepared to be sentenced at this time* Mr. Salaz is 
20 prepared to recommend zero to five, concurrent with 
21 the one to 15. 
22 THE COURT: Is that correct, 
23 Mr. Salaz? 
24 MR* SALAZ: That's correct, Your 
25 Honor. 
Laurie shingle, R.P.R. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. 
2 MR. GRAVIS: We'd ask that you 
3 fellow that recommendation. 
4 1 THE COURT: Very well. 
5 MR. DAINES: We would not object to 
6 that, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Court finds the 
8 defendant is in violation of his probation by having 
9 been convicted by a plea of guilty of the charge of 
10 Burglary. It's the order of the Court that the 
11 defendant be committed to prison for a period of not 
12 less than zero or more than five years. That's to 
13 run concurrently with the existing sentences. 
14 MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
15 MR. CHAVE2: Thank you* 
16 J THE COURT: Is there any further 
17 matter of business that should come before the Court? 
18 KR. DAINES: No. That concludes the 
19 State's calendar this afternoon, Your Honor. Thank 
2 0 you very much, 
21 THE COURT: Court's in recess. 
22 (WHEREUPON, at this time proceedings 
23 conclude.) 
24 
25 
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foregoing eight pages of transcript constitute a true 
and accurate record of the proceedings to the best of 
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APPENDIX C 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. CHAVEZ, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT/SENTENCE AND 
COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE 
PRISON 
Case No. 921900414 
The defendant appeared in court for sentencing after conviction by jury 
court _XX plea of guilty plea of no contest of the offense of Retail Theft, a felony 
of the 3RD degree. The defendant is adjudged guilty of this offense and is sentenced as 
follows: 
Basic Sentence 
Not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison. 
Not less than one year nor more than 15 years at the Utah State Prison. 
Not less than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison. 
Sentence to run [ ] consecutive p(] concurrent with sentence defendant i s new 
serving. 
Fine of $ and state surcharge of $_ j, for a total of$ 
[ ) 
The court recommends to the Board of Pardons that the defendant receive 
credit for [ ] all time previously served [ ] days. 
The court deviates from the sentencing guidelines because it finds 
aggravation based on 
[ ] Additional information^ 
Restitution 
[ ] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_ to 
State v. CHAVEZ 
Case 921900414 
Prison Commitment-Page Two 
Commitment 
he defendant is remanded into the custody of : 
The sheriff of Weber County for delivery to the warden of the Utah State 
Prison for execution of the sentence. 
[^  The warden of the Utah State Prison for execution of this sentence. 
Dated this 5TH day of JULY 
Signed: 
.,199 4 
